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“Now I want to speak about the unspeakable: I am almost tempted to suggest that 
women and young people leave the room. The subject is one that, if it is mentioned at 
all in polite company, is grouped with witchcraft, drunkenness, and the abuse of 
children, things that we know are there but that are best denied. It is possible that one 
source of continued high unemployment in Europe is that the domestic demand for 
goods and services, and therefore for labor, has been forced to unnecessarily and 
unhealthily low levels.” (emphasis added) Robert Solow (2000: 9) 
1. Introduction  
There is now an influential ‘macroeconomic consensus’ among European researchers, 
which we term the OECD consensus, as to the cause of unemployment persistence 
(Arestis and Sawyer, 2002). The consensus posits that “the rigidities imposed by labor 
market institutions and policies … play a key role in the explanation of the European 
unemployment crisis of the 1980’s and 1990’s.” The OECD’s Job Study (1994) and 
follow-up report (OECD, 1999) exemplify the consensus. There is also a broad 
consistency between the OECD and academic research on the determinants of 
unemployment (see Elsmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta, 1998). 
On June 19, 2003, the Dutch CPB Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis issued a press 
release entitled (in English) “Social security and union power induce structural high 
unemployment”, which referred to a comparative study of some OECD countries by 
van der Horst (2003). The study concluded that the “equilibrium unemployment rate 
can be explained from (sic) fluctuations in the tax wedge, the replacement rate, the 
minimum wage rate and the user cost of capital” (van der Horst, 2003: 7). 
Accordingly, cutting labour costs, taxes, social security premiums and general welfare 
retrenchment will result in lower unemployment. Van der Horst (2003) follows in the 
recent tradition set by the CPB (Graafland and Huizinga, 1999; Broer et al, 2000) and 
is consistent with studies such as Phelps and Zoega (1998) and Blanchard (2000), 
which all support the OECD consensus. Interestingly, van der Horst (2003) departs 
starkly from his earlier work (van der Horst et al, 1996: abstract) which concluded 
that “the elementary requirements of economic plausibility and statistical significance 
prohibit NAIRU computation for the Netherlands” (NAIRU stands for Non-
Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment). 
The CPB press release and accompanying policy proposals were feted in leading 
Dutch newspapers and reflected in social security reductions announced by the new 
Dutch government in its first budget in September 2003. Alarmingly, the economic 
analysis underlying these conclusions and proposals has received less scrutiny. Given 
the strident policy stance arising from the OECD consensus and its potential negative 
overtones for living standards, a risk-averse strategy is indicated. Researchers should 
ensure their theoretical and empirical approaches are robust beyond reasonable doubt. 
The empirical literature used to support the OECD consensus is now known to have 
serious problems (for example, Chang, 1997; Fair, 2000; Akerlof et al, 2000; Arestis 
and Mariscal, 2000; Mitchell, 2001a). Baker et al (2002) critically examine several 
key empirical studies that underpin the OECD consensus (OECD, 1999; Nickell, 
1997; Elsmekov, Martin and Scarpetta, 1998; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Belot and 
Van Ours, 2002; Nickell et al, 2002; Bertola, Blau and Kahn, 2001). Baker et al 
(2002: 3) say that “while these studies tend to conclude that institutions are a key part 
of the story, the actual empirical results appear far less robust and uniform across 
studies than is commonly believed.” 
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Baker et al (2002) provide the following assessment of this literature: (a) Using “the 
most supportive results from each study, we see a disconcerting range of estimates of 
the impact of institutions” (Baker et al, 2002: 43); (b) The size of many of the 
estimated effects “is too large to be plausible”; “the sizes of several of the coefficient 
estimates in Nickell (1997) are clearly implausible”; Nickell et al (2001) “also reports 
implausible coefficient estimates” using a “structure of the regressions … [that] … is 
highly unusual” (Baker et al, 2002: 43); (c) Labour market coordination seems to 
reduce unemployment which makes the OECD’s insistence on decentralised wage 
bargaining appear odd; (d) Bertola et al (2001) “mostly finds weak results, although 
their discussion implies otherwise” (Baker et al, 2002: 46); (e) Blanchard and Wolfers 
(2000) produce “mixed results” which are “highly sensitive to specification, and 
regressions using time-varying measures of institutions produce weaker results than 
regressions that assume these institutions never change” (Baker et al, 2002: 46); and 
(f) The results reported in this literature “are decidedly not robust to … variations” 
(Baker et al, 2002: 46) in variable specification, sample, and estimation method. 
As motivation, in Figure 1, we show the estimated equilibrium unemployment rates 
from Broer et al (2000) and van der Horst (2003) and the official CPB unemployment 
rate. The divergent equilibrium estimates in the two studies are notable and support 
the findings of Baker et al (2002) concerning sensitivity of estimates to data and 
specification (see also Mitchell and Muysken, 2003). Further, the movements in all 
series appear to be cyclical. 
Figure 1 Estimated equilibrium unemployment rates and Official rate, % 
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Broer et al (2000: 363, Figure 2) also provide 95 per cent confidence intervals for 
their equilibrium estimates (not shown here). There are only 7 years when the actual 
unemployment rate was outside the ‘equilibrium’ confidence interval (above) (1982 to 
1988). There is thus very little extra information being generated by these models by 
their ‘equilibrium’ estimates. 
‘Telling the story’ appears to be more important than attending to anomalies arising 
from the empirical enquiry (Mitchell, 2001a). Many issues are sidestepped to avoid 
‘getting in the way of the story’. For example, supply-side theories of unemployment 
must also explain the rationality of the implied unmet demand for goods. Logically 
there must be queues of consumers who want to buy items but cannot because labour 
supply is not sufficient to produce them. Apparently reducing welfare payments 
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would resolve the unmet demand by increasing production. None of this is believable 
and similar questions are consistently avoided by NAIRU proponents. Manning 
(1998: 145) says “we have very strong a priori beliefs from theory that there should 
be such a link [between unemployment benefits and unemployment], beliefs that are 
so strong that we can read … [Manning refers to a highly spurious claim from the 
OECD Jobs Study linking reforms in Sweden and Switzerland in the 1970s to rising 
unemployment in the 1990s] … and not think anything is amiss. We need to be honest 
about the fact that theory plays a disturbingly large part in informing discussion about 
the impact of unemployment insurance on the labour market.” 
In this paper we investigate several propositions that we consider underscore the 
poverty of the NAIRU approach. We draw on Mitchell and Muysken (2003) where 
we conduct a detailed analysis of the econometric work provided by Broer et al 
(2000) and van der Horst (2003). In Section 2 we show the strong link between 
aggregate demand movements and the dynamics and persistence of unemployment for 
the Netherlands. In Section 3 we review more recent theoretical criticisms of the 
NAIRU approach, which clearly show that aggregate demand dynamics influence 
equilibrium unemployment and thus places the ‘structural’ interpretation of the 
NAIRU in jeopardy. In Section 4, we focus on Broer et al (2000) and Van der Horst 
(2003), and conclude that key theoretical and empirical claims made by them do not 
stand up to close scrutiny. We conclude by rejecting the major conclusions of OECD 
consensus that constructs persistently high unemployment as a problem of labour 
market rigidities and government welfare and tax policies. It is hard to escape the 
conclusion that the major reason for unemployment lies in deficient demand.  
2. Some basic facts that have to be addressed 
Initially, we examine some basic facts that are essential to understanding the evolution 
of Dutch unemployment but which are largely ignored by the OECD consensus. 
2.1 Okun accounting 
Table 1 summarise some major Dutch economic aggregates since 1970, using the 
CPB Main Economic Indicators represented as average annual compound rates of 
growth. 
Table 1 Major Output and labour force growth aggregates, Netherlands, 1970-2002 
 LF EMP LP GDP GDP* GDP Gap Ave UR 
 % p.a. % p.a. % p.a. % p.a. % p.a. % p.a. % 
1970-75 0.6 0.4 3.0 3.3 3.6 0.2 1.5 
1975-80 1.2 0.9 1.6 2.6 2.8 0.2 3.0 
1980-85 0.3 -1.1 2.4 1.3 2.7 1.4 7.5 
1985-90 2.3 2.8 0.4 3.2 2.7 -0.5 7.8 
1990-95 1.4 1.1 1.0 2.1 2.3 0.2 7.1 
1995-00 2.0 2.9 0.8 3.7 2.8 -0.9 5.6 
1970-02 1.3 1.2 1.3 2.6 2.7 0.1 5.2 
Source: CPB Report 2003/3. LF is the labour force, EMP is total employment, GDP is total real output, 
LP is labour productivity, GDP* is the required GDP growth to maintain a constant unemployment 
rate, UR is the unemployment rate averaged over the time period shown. The numbers are rounded. 
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For the unemployment rate to remain constant, output growth has to match the sum of 
labour force growth (LF) and labour productivity growth (LP) or GDP*. The Dutch 
unemployment rate was 0.6 per cent in 1970 rising to 3.9 per cent in 2002 having 
peaked in 1983-1984 at 9.7 per cent. The data shows that major changes in 
unemployment during 1980-85 were accompanied by a shrinking labour force and an 
even greater decline in GDP growth. The evidence shows that the Dutch labour 
market responds positively to strong GDP growth driving strong employment growth. 
Between 1985 and 1990, as the Dutch economy recovered, unemployment persisted 
due to strong labour force growth. The sustained strong employment growth in the 
1995-2000 period coupled with a somewhat slower labour force growth saw major 
inroads being made into the Dutch unemployment rate. 
Figure 2 Relationship between GDP growth and EGAP, The Netherlands, 1970-2002 
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Source: Table 1. EGAP is the annual percentage difference between employment growth and labour 
force growth. GDP growth is the annual growth in output. 
In Figure 2, we plot GDP growth against EGAP (the difference between employment 
growth and labour force growth) with a simple linear regression added. When the 
economy is adding jobs in excess of the growth in workers EGAP is positive. The 
correlation between the two series is high (0.68) adding weight to our claim that 
aggregate demand rather than labour force (supply) dominates employment changes. 
2.2 Employment and demand 
Mitchell and Muysken (2002) conclude after detailed analysis that employment 
dynamics are driven by variations in aggregate demand. As a summary, and following 
Modigliani (2000), Figure 3 plots the unemployment rate (left hand scale) against the 
sum of employment and vacancies (as a percentage of labour force) as a measure of 
labour demand (right hand scale inverted). The striking correspondence between the 
two series suggests that variations in unemployment appear to be strongly associated 
with movements in labour demand. After analysing France, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom, Modigliani (2000: 5) said “Everywhere unemployment has risen because of 
a large shrinkage in the number of positions needed to satisfy existing demand.” 
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Figure 3 Labour demand and unemployment, The Netherlands, 1966-2000 
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Source: Mitchell and Muysken (2002). 
2.3 The dynamics of unemployment and vacancies 
The OECD consensus claims that labour supply changes over the last 25 years have 
combined to ensure that full employment coincides with much higher unemployment 
rates than in the past. This is allegedly demonstrated by the outward shift in the 
unemployment-vacancy (UV) relationship, which occurred in the Netherlands in 1981 
(Mitchell and Muysken, 2002). Prominent proponents of the OECD consensus, 
Layard, Jackman and Nickell (1991: 38), explain the outward shift in the European 
UV curve by “a fall in the search effectiveness … among the unemployed.” However, 
with Dutch UV ratio averaging around 7 unemployed persons per vacancy over the 
last 26 years, it is a fallacy of composition to conclude that if all individuals reduced 
their reservation wage to the minimum (to maximise supply-side search effectiveness) 
that unemployment would fall significantly (given the small estimated real balance 
effects in most studies). Further, unless growth in labour requirements and the labour 
force are cyclically symmetrical, the pool of unemployed can rise and remain 
persistently high (Mitchell, 2001b). 
Figure 4 produces phase diagrams for the unemployment rate and the vacancy rate in 
the Netherlands (Ormerod, 1994; Mitchell, 2001c). The current values of the series 
are plotted on the y-axis against the lagged value of the same series on the x-axis. 
Figure 4(a) reveals that the Dutch unemployment attractor shifted outwards around 
1974-76. In the early 1990s, the Dutch labour market oscillated rather tightly around 
this new attractor but in recent years has shown signs of moving downwards. 
However, with the current contraction incomplete it is unclear whether a new attractor 
will be established or whether a particularly large oscillation around the previously 
higher attractor is occurring. It is also clear that the economy takes several years to 
recover from a large negative shock even when the attractor remains constant. 
Figure 4(b) suggests that the 1974-75 disturbances also coincided with a downwards 
movement in the vacancy rate attractor. Similarly, the outward shift in the vacancy 
rate (and possibly a new attractor being established) in the 1990s coincides with the 
favourable downward movements in unemployment during that period. 
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Figure 4 Phase diagrams for unemployment rate and vacancy rates, The Netherlands 
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(b) 1961-2002 
Source: Figure 2 and CPB (2003) 
The OECD consensus interprets the outward unemployment shift in Figure 4(a) as a 
decline in labour market efficiency. But the inward shift in Figure 4(b) using the same 
logic would be interpreted as increasing matching efficiency. Clearly, both states 
cannot hold. A consistent interpretation can be found in the view that the Dutch 
economy was demand constrained in the mid-1970s as a result of the collapse of the 
world trade. The rapid rise in unemployment in 1974 was so large that subsequent 
(lower) growth with on-going labour force and productivity growth could not reverse 
the stockpile of unemployed (see Mitchell, 2001a for similar Australian analysis). 
Two conclusions can be drawn from the phase diagrams. First, negative shifts in 
attractors coincide with recessions. Second, the economy tends to oscillate around 
these attractors once they are established. This implies that adverse demand shocks 
have a strong negative impact on unemployment through hysteresis. Thus demand 
shocks have an adverse impact on unemployment through the direct effects on job 
creation, as highlighted in the previous section, and indirectly, through hysteresis. 
The shifts in attractor points depict non-linear time series behaviour. The issue of non-
linearity is important to policy makers aiming to minimise the costs of economic 
fluctuations. Yet macroeconomic models which underpin the OECD consensus 
generally employ smooth functions with some allowance for persistence and 
accordingly cannot accommodate asymmetries. Mitchell and Muysken (2002) 
estimate Current Depth of Recession (CDR) models (Beaudry and Koop, 1993) and 
show that negative shocks impact more strongly than positive shocks on Dutch and 
Australian unemployment rates. If one seeks to understand the evolution of Dutch 
unemployment then it is important to take into account this non-linear behaviour. The 
OECD consensus models fail in this regard. 
3. The NAIRU – from structural invariance to anything goes! 
In this section, we consider the evolution of theoretical models that have been used to 
underpin the OECD consensus. We conclude that once deconstructed it is little 
wonder that the concept of equilibrium unemployment loses its original ‘structural’ 
meaning and becomes indistinguishable in dynamics from actual unemployment. 
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3.1 The basic OECD consensus model 
Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) start with a right-to-manage bargaining model, 
which yields a real wage equation where unemployment affects wages through “the 
ease with which a worker of average effectiveness can find a job if she becomes 
unemployed.” Figure 5 depicts the resulting negative relationship between 
unemployment and the bargained real wage (BRW). Nickell and van Ours (2000) note 
that inflation surprises p - pe reduce the BRW. Prices are mark-ups on marginal costs, 
after maximising short-run profits. Since the mark-up is negatively related to 
unemployment, the PRW-curve describes the resulting positive real wage-
unemployment relationship (see Figure 5). 
The NAIRU, the unemployment rate consistent with both wage setting and price 
setting behaviour in the absence of inflation surprises (constant inflation), is given by 
u* in Figure 5. The NAIRU is ‘the’ equilibrium rate because inflation-averse 
authorities use aggregate policy to maintain low inflation. The conduct of fiscal and 
monetary policy thus determines fluctuations in actual unemployment around the 
NAIRU (Nickell and van Ours, 2000). 
Figure 5 NAIRU determination by the BRW and PRW curves 
 
3.2 The role of capital costs 
With mark-up prices, wage costs relative to capital costs are relevant, meaning that 
capital costs should be included in the price equation (Blanchard, 1997). Moreover, 
the real interest rate may also affect hiring costs, investment in firm-specific human 
capital and costs of creating customer markets (Phelps, 1994; Phelps and Zoega, 
1998). Accordingly, real interest rate rises increase the NAIRU. This induced Phelps 
and Blanchard to blame high unemployment in the 1980s on high real interest rates. 
In this spirit Broer et al (2000) analysed Dutch unemployment from 1966 to 1996. 
Their ‘steady-state’ model ignores inflation surprises with a wage equation written as: 
w – p = h + γ0 - γ1u + zw       (1) 
where w and p are log wages and prices, respectively, h represents log productivity, u 
is the unemployment rate and zw reflects other wage setting influences. 
w - p 
n
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To introduce labour augmenting technological change, they use a CES production 
function with an elasticity of substitution σ of less than unity. Capital costs now 
explicitly appear in the profit-maximising labour demand function: 
l = β + θ + y – σ( pl – cc ) – w + pl      (2) 
where y, l and pl are log output, labour and efficiency corrected price for labour, 
respectively, cc is a log unit cost measure and β is an efficiency parameter.  
Prices p are mark-ups on marginal costs: 
p = µ + β + cc         (3) 
where µ is log mark-up (we ignore foreign prices here). Equations (2) and (3) yield a 
PRW-curve which is independent of unemployment and where capital costs play a 
role through f( cc – pk) with f’> 0: 
w – p = h –µ + θ + (1-σ) f( cc – pk)   f’> 0   (4) 
Equation (4) shows that rising capital costs shift the now horizontal PRW-curve 
downwards in Figure 5. 
Combining Equations (1) and (4), the NAIRU becomes: 
u* = [ µ – θ – (1-σ) f( cc – pk) + γ0 + zw]/γ1     (5) 
Equation (5) shows that the rental price of capital pk impacts positively on the NAIRU 
via labour demand. A unit elasticity of substitution would eliminate the impact of 
capital costs on unemployment (see also Rowthorn, 1999).  
3.3 Productivity shocks and the adjustment process 
Broer et al (2000) do not analyse the equilibrium adjustment process following 
shocks. They impose error correction mechanisms in their dynamic specifications 
without explanation and restrict them in such a way that “the equilibrium … will 
eventually be reached” (Broer et al, 2000: 355-56). Blanchard (2000), however, does 
focus on adjustment processes and distinguishes between a short- and medium-run 
labour demand function. He concludes that slowing Total Factor Productivity growth 
caused the European unemployment up to the 1980s. However, the 1980s increase in 
real interest rates explains a significant amount of the European unemployment 
persistence during that decade and into the 1990s. Blanchard (2000) considers high 
real interest rates resulted from erroneous monetary policies pursued during that 
period and his work represents a significant and explicit shift in the NAIRU literature. 
While Blanchard analyses the impact of productivity shocks through delayed wage 
adjustment, Rowthorn (1999) presents a different mechanism. He shows that the 
invariance of unemployment to technical change and productivity shocks in Layard, 
Nickell and Jackman (1991) results from two key assumptions: (a) a unit elasticity of 
substitution, and (b) a constant benefit rate. If the elasticity of substitution is less than 
one the capital stock influences the labour demand and via price equation (4) is 
implicit in unit costs. So interest rate rises also result in higher unemployment by 
reducing the capital stock and labour demand. In that context, Rowthorn (1999: 422-
423) emphasises that investment should be “on average just sufficient to keep pace 
with ... any bias in technical progress … [and] … measures to stimulate investment 
could play an important role in helping to reduce unemployment, and that the present 
emphasis on labour market policies is exaggerated.” By pushing the PRW-curve out, 
interest rate rises increase the NAIRU. 
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3.4 The importance of aggregate demand 
Modigliani (2000) observed a strong correlation between actual unemployment and 
the net investment rate and claims that this is due to aggregate demand effects. While 
Blanchard (2000: 29) is unable to explain this phenomenon, which he dubs the 
“Modigliani puzzle”, Sawyer (2002) presents an interesting solution arguing that a 
sufficiently expansionary environment can generate sufficient investment to make the 
NAIRU compatible with full employment. 
In terms of Figure 5, Sawyer (2002) suggests that the BRW curve does not necessarily 
increase proportionally with productivity (coefficient before h in Equation (1) can be 
less than one). Labour demand by firms is influenced by their price-setting behaviour, 
where he assumes a counter-cyclical mark-up (which increases again close to full-
capacity utilisation). Since Sawyer assumes nominal wages are set at firm level 
according to efficiency wage level W* (which is independent of overall demand), a 
unique level of labour demand l0 results from short-run profit maximising behaviour 
of firms, which is conditional on the firm’s capital stock and aggregate demand. The 
price is set at P0. Sawyer derives the analogue of the PRW-curve by varying the level 
of aggregate demand Z. Since for each different Z a different l0 and P0 will result, a 
relationship between labour demand l0 and the real wage W*/P0 can be drawn, which 
reflects the result of firm price-setting and labour demand at different levels of Z. The 
resulting PRW-curve shifts upwards when the capital stock increases.  
Point A in Figure 5 indicates the rate of unemployment consistent with stable 
inflation. Sawyer (2002) suggests that boosting aggregate demand will stimulate 
investment and, as the inflation barrier is simultaneously driven out, the NAIRU can 
be rendered consistent with full employment. Sawyer (2002: 92) says “Policies which 
seek to restrain inflation through higher levels of unemployment may well cause the 
NAIRU to rise and to sustain higher levels of unemployment.” 
While Sawyer (2002) confirms the link between the NAIRU and aggregate demand 
and thus helps jettison the cyclical invariance argument, the novelty of his analysis is 
that firm price setting behaviour is linked to aggregate demand through counter-
cyclical variations in the mark-up. Accordingly, at given levels of capacity, increases 
in aggregate demand will lead to an upward shift in the PRW curve for relatively low 
values of capacity utilisation and a downward shift for higher values. Hence, starting 
from a low value of capacity utilisation, the NAIRU will initially decrease when 
aggregate demand is stimulated and increase again when full capacity is approached. 
Sawyer (2002) also emphasises a positive accelerator effect from aggregate demand 
and the resulting reductions in the NAIRU. 
4. Empirical links between aggregate demand and the NAIRU 
The analysis in Section 3 confirms that any notion that the business cycle cannot 
influence the NAIRU is unsustainable. Aside from cyclical mark-up behaviour and 
investment variations which influence the NAIRU, one might conjecture that other 
wage and price-setting ‘structural’ influences are also sensitive to aggregate pressures. 
We consider this question with reference to the models presented in Broer et al (2000) 
and van der Horst (2003), both reflecting the current OECD and CPB-tradition. 
4.1 Making sense of the data 
A major problem we have in determining the validity of the various CPB offerings is 
the seeming endless variations in data used. This holds in particular for wedge and the 
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replacement rate variables. In 2002, the CPB made major revisions to wedge and 
replacement rate data (CPB, 2003) without adequate explanation and were content to 
merely source Stegeman (2002). However, Stegeman (2002) fails to explicitly justify 
the revisions saying only that in the past, data was mainly based on national accounts 
and that with the growing CPB use of computable “general equilibrium” models more 
data is now derived from household surveys. 
Figure 6 Dutch wedge and replacement rate inconsistencies 
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Source: CPB (2002), Broer et al (2000), van der Horst (2003). 
There are many well documented difficulties encountered in the measurement of the 
wedge and replacement rates (van Veen 1997). Figure 6 plots three wedge and four 
replacement rate series that have been used, variously, in Broer et al (2000), van der 
Horst (2003) and the old and recent official CPB data (CPB 2002, 2003). Clearly, 
both the wedge and replacement rate have been grossly overestimated in the past (van 
Veen 1997). Since all authors mention the CPB as their data source, we can not trace 
the reasons for these discrepancies any further. 
Figure 7 Dutch unemployment rate concepts 
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Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators, Eurostat Macroeconomic Database and CPB (2003). 
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Several unemployment rate series have also been used. In Figure 7 we show the 
OECD Standardised Unemployment Rate (UR_MEI), the Eurostat unemployment rate 
(U_AMECO) used by van der Horst (2003), and the official CPB rate (U_CPB) used 
by Broer et al (2000). Ad hoc definitional changes and differences in definitions per 
se appear to be the explanation for the variations. 
Table 2 shows the wide variation in wage and labour demand estimates from Broer et 
al (2000) and van der Horst (2003) using this data. Although the evolution of the 
replacement rate since 1970 is quite similar in both studies (Figure 6b), van der Horst 
estimates the impact on wages around 2.5 times larger that that found by Broer et al. 
The opposite holds for the impact of the wedge and unemployment. It therefore also is 
not surprising that the two studies provide quite different NAIRU estimates (see 
Figure 1). However, it is obvious that the implications for economic policy also are 
quite different between both studies if one were to take their results seriously. 
Table 2 Estimation results of Broer et al (2000), van der Horst (2003) 
 Broer et al. (2000) Van der Horst (2003) 
 1966-1995 1970-1998 
Wage Equation:   
Wedge  0.28 (0.09) 0.13 (0.06) 
Replacement rate 0.29 (0.08) 0.75 (0.08) 
Unemployment rate1 -1.76 (0.35) -1.07 (0.23) 
Labour Demand Equation:   
Sigma2 0.34 (0.08) 0.33 (0.06) 
Trend 0.014 (0.001) 0.010 (0.001) 
Trend squared -0.001 (0.000) -0.004 (0.001) 
1. Broer et al (2000) use the current unemployment rate while van der Horst (2003) uses the lagged 
unemployment rate. 2. sigma is the elasticity of substitution. Standard errors are in parentheses 
4.2 The BRW-curve: when structural becomes cyclical 
In line with many NAIRU studies, Broer et al (2000) and van der Horst (2003) 
represent the structural variables using the tax wedge and the replacement ratio which 
they consider modify the wage-unemployment rate relationship (Equation 1). Mitchell 
and Muysken (2003) question the validity of the wage-unemployment relationships 
they propose, but as a prior issue, how certain are we that the so-called ‘structural’ 
variables are cyclically invariant? This issue mirrors the 1980s debate between Lilien 
(1982) and Abraham and Katz (1986). For example, the wedge attempts to measure 
differences between gross wage costs (borne by employers) and net wage income 
(received by workers). In a bargaining context the wedge will, plausibly, be 
compressed at higher unemployment rates which makes it problematic using the 
wedge as a right-hand side variable along with the unemployment rate. 
From Table 3, it is clear that the ‘structural’ variables used by Broer et al (2000), van 
der Horst (2003), and the official CPB measures vary counter-cyclically with capacity 
utilisation which is consistent with a priori reasoning. In the upturn falling 
unemployment means that lower social security premiums are needed to cover 
expenses and the wedge will be lower. The replacement rate rises as unemployment 
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rises because there is increasing-pressure to increase social security in a downturn. As 
a consequence of the counter-cyclical behaviour of these so-called ‘structural’ 
variables the NAIRU will tend to track the actual unemployment rate in line with 
demand changes rendering it void of any meaningful independent content. Pairwise 
Granger-causality tests confirm the results reported in Table 3 (results on request). 
Table 3 Testing wedge and replacement rate variables for cyclical influence 
 Replacement Rate Wedge 
 VDH Broer CPB VDH Broer CPB 
dvar(-1) 0.21 
(1.42) 
0.02 
(0.21) 
0.18 
(1.07) 
-0.09 
(0.43) 
0.20 
(1.04) 
0.26 
(1.55) 
dlog(CU) -0.19 
(1.73) 
-0.23 
(3.05) 
-0.23 
(2.97) 
-0.24 
(0.83) 
0.10 
(0.57) 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
dlog (CU(-1)) -0.29 
(2.56) 
-0.18 
(2.26) 
-0.14 
(1.64) 
-0.21 
(0.73) 
-0.39 
(2.19) 
-0.23 
(1.96) 
R2 0.35 0.37 0.39 0.06 0.19 0.19 
Smple 1970-2003 1970-2003 1972-2003 1971-1998 1970-1997 1972-2003
Notes: Constant not reported; dependent variables were in change of log form; dvar(-1) is the lagged 
dependent variable; CU is the rate of capacity utilisation; t-statistics are in parentheses. Data is from 
Broer = Broer et al (2000), VDH = van der Horst (2003) and CPB = current official data from the CPB. 
4.3 The PRW-curve : A mark-up on (labour) demand 
The PRW-curve (Equation 4) of Broer et al (2000) is derived from the labour demand 
equation (2) and the price mark-up equation (3). Van der Horst (2003) assumes 
without explanation that there is no mark up, so p = cc. Thus, the price of labour 
relative to output price is his measure of relative factor prices in labour demand 
equation (2). So if the mark-up p/cc is not constant then the residuals from the 
estimated demand function will reflect variations in the mark-up. The residuals will 
reflect trends in working time, which declined consistently over the estimation period. 
All three factors show a clear correlation with output (Mitchell and Muysken, 2003). 
It therefore is not surprising that the residuals from the estimated labour demand 
function are negatively related to output growth (Figure 8) (correlation = -0.58). 
Figure 8 Estimated labour demand residuals and output growth, van der Horst (2003) 
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Another way of examining this issue is to estimate van der Horst’s (2003) labour 
productivity equation (column 2 Table 4) as an employment function with the 
coefficient on output freely estimated. In Table 4, we see that the coefficient on real 
output is clearly below unity (Prob value = 0.04 on restriction) (column 3) and the real 
wage becomes insignificant. Care is needed, however, in conducting any inference on 
van der Horst’s (2003) equations given the severe serial correlation. 
Table 4 van der Horst’s (2003) employment function re-estimated 
 employment/output employment 
 (2) (3) 
Real output 1.00 
(-) 
0.664 
(4.12) 
Real wage -0.325 
(-5.47) 
-0.163 
(-1.70) 
Trend -0.016 
(-10.00) 
-0.012 
(-4.95) 
Trend-squared 0.000 
(5.21) 
0.000 
(5.55) 
R2 0.986 0.985 
S(1) Prob value 0.02 0.00 
Sample 1970-1998 
Notes: van der Horst (2003) estimates his labour demand function with the unit coefficient on real 
output imposed so the equation is a labour productivity relation (column 2), t-statistics in parentheses, 
S(1) is the Prob value for the LM test for first-order serial correlation. 
While van der Horst (2003) estimates the PRW-curve (7) directly, Broer et al (2000) 
derive this from Equations (2) and (3), which they estimate separately. The underlying 
cost function is C = β y cc, where cc are unit labour costs. When scale effects are 
absent, β = 1, and average costs equal marginal costs. However, Broer et al (2000) 
introduce a fudge factor claiming that oil price shocks might affect productivity 
(Bruno and Sachs, 1985), which they ‘capture’ with a dummy to β that is linear in the 
relative price of energy and its growth rate. As a consequence the variable β follows 
the pattern which is inversely presented on the left-hand side of Figure 8(a). It clearly 
follows a pattern similar to that of the growth rate of output (lagged, right-hand scale) 
and hence might obscure the impact of aggregate demand on the mark-up. 
If we assume β constant and compare the movements in the mark-up p/cc with real 
output growth, Figure 8(b) shows that the co-variation is mixed, but suggests the 
presumed counter-cyclical pattern. To examine this further we estimated a general 
first-order dynamic model with percentage change in the mark-up on the rate of 
capacity utilisation and lags. This specification reflected the finding that the mark-up 
is I(1) and the rate of capacity utilisation is I(0) by construction. The general 
regression displayed stationary residuals and was simplified using valid F-tests to 
yield the equation as follows: 
2
(5.61) (6.01)
log( ) 0.07 0.38log( )
0.55 (1) 0.09 (1) 0.44
d m cu
R S A
= − −
= = =
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where m is the mark-up and cu is the rate of capacity utilisation. The Prob values are 
shown for LM test for first-order serial correlation S(1) and heteroscedasticity A(1); 
the Ramsey reset test Prob value was 0.92; t-statistics are shown in parentheses.  
Figure 8 “Productivity shocks” and the mark-up in Broer et al (2000) 
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(a) “Productivity shocks” and output growth 
0.84
0.88
0.92
0.96
1.00
1.04
1.08
1.12
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
.08
.10
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Mark-up Real output growth
 
(b) The mark-up and output growth 
Source: Broer et al (2000) 
Our findings support Sawyer’s (2002) counter cyclical mark-up hypothesis and 
suggest that increasing aggregate demand reduced the NAIRU (compare Equation (5) 
with a counter-cyclical µ). We note that Broer et al (2000) introduce, in an ad hoc 
fashion, foreign output prices in their price equation which fudges the impact of 
capacity utilisation. Further, as our discussion of van der Horst has indicated, the 
impact of changes in output on other variables in the PRW equation cannot be 
ignored. A complete picture of the impact of aggregate demand on the mark up and 
the NAIRU therefore requires a more extensive analysis. 
5. Concluding remarks  
This paper is a precursor to Mitchell and Muysken (2003) which conducts a forensic 
examination on recent Dutch research on equilibrium unemployment to test whether 
they stand up to scrutiny? In this paper, we document some major preliminary 
concerns with are consistent with recent developments in the theoretical literature on 
the NAIRU.  
We argue that it cannot be reasonably concluded that the evolution of unemployment 
is driven by misguided tax and welfare policies and the research that tries to support 
this type of reasoning is without firm foundation. We show that there is a plausible 
case that employment dynamics are driven by aggregate demand movements with the 
unemployment rate being residual. The concept of equilibrium unemployment appears 
to contain no additional information to that already known from the evolution of the 
unemployment rate. 
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